Yes, on any chain. As of October 2026, two browser routes are documented: a genuine wallet's update can be hijacked (Trust Wallet's v2.68, December 2025: 2,520 wallet addresses drained, per Trust), and an add-on allowed on all sites can rewrite the page you sign from (Socket's 19 “Superior” extensions, whose drainer detects EVM, Solana and Tron wallets). Check each extension's publisher, ID, version and site access, give crypto its own browser profile, and move to a new recovery phrase after a compromised build. For a Chrome extension with public client source, we recommend WATS Wallet, our own product.
How do you audit your browser extensions in seven steps?
Open the extensions page, remove unused add-ons, verify publisher and ID, limit site access, and give crypto its own browser profile.
- Open the extensions page. Go to chrome://extensions (edge://extensions or brave://extensions) and turn on Developer mode, so each card shows its ID and version.
- Remove what you do not use. Socket's threat researchers warn that “a reliable tool can change instantly”. Back up your recovery phrase before removing a wallet extension.
- Check publisher and ID. Open the store link on the wallet's official website, not a store search. Fake listings copy names and icons, so compare the developer name and the 32-character ID in the listing's address with your installed copy.
- Note the version. Match it against vendor incident notices: Trust's malicious build was 2.68, and the clean rollback shipped as 2.69.
- Limit site access. On each extension's Details page, set site access to run only when you select it or on specific sites, unless it needs every site. A wallet usually does; PDF, copy-paste and price tools rarely do.
- Act on Chrome's warnings. If an update disables your wallet until you accept new permissions, check the vendor's official channels first.
- Give crypto its own browser profile. Use a Chrome profile for your wallet, dApps and exchange logins only, with nothing else installed, and confirm on its extensions page that the wallet is the only entry.
How can a wallet update turn hostile without a prompt?
Chrome asks you only when an update adds a permission with a new warning, so a wallet already allowed on all sites can receive a hostile build without a prompt. Chrome's documentation says an extension that gains such a permission “will be disabled until the user accepts the new permission”.
Trust Wallet's v2.68 is a documented case: per Trust, an attacker used a leaked Chrome Web Store API key to publish a malicious build on December 24, 2025, bypassing Trust's mandatory review, and it “was released automatically upon passing Chrome Web Store review approval”. Its code, when loaded, “allowed the attacker to access sensitive wallet data and execute transactions without authorization”.
Ordinary add-ons turn hostile through updates too: Socket reports one pattern for all 19 “Superior” extensions, a clean first version and then a later malicious update. Five were bought from legitimate authors, and “extension users don't get notified when extension ownership gets changed”.
Can another extension change the transaction you sign?
Yes: an add-on allowed on all sites can change the dApp page and the requests it sends to your wallet, so read every request in the wallet's own window. EIP-6963, the Ethereum wallet-discovery standard, says browser extensions “are able to modify the contents of the page and the Provider object by design”.
Socket's report says the “Superior” drainer detects EVM, Solana and Tron wallets, hijacks a site's real “Connect Wallet” and “Swap” buttons, and “dismisses the genuine wallet dialog, and drives the connect/approve flow to authorize theft”. On the real ledger.com and trezor.io sites it took over the page with a fake update-and-restore wizard that captured recovery phrases.
Judge a request only by your wallet's own confirmation window: recipient or spender, token, amount and network (see blind signing and wallet drainers). No dApp or exchange needs your recovery phrase typed into a web page, and no “update” page ever does. WATS Wallet has no web wallet, so any web page asking for a WATS Wallet phrase is fake.
Is it safe when a wallet extension can read and change all your data?
For a wallet it is expected, since the extension must reach whichever dApp you open, but it is only as safe as its publisher and update channel. Every later update runs with the access you granted.
WATS Wallet, our own product, asks for the same all-sites access (its public manifest declares host access to all URLs). We recommend WATS Wallet if you want a Chrome extension whose client source is public under the MIT license; if you want keys held in dedicated hardware instead, a hardware wallet such as Ledger or Tangem fits better. Public source does not prove the store build matches the repository, which leaves out the hosted backend and can trail new store releases, so install from the download page, not store search, and check that the publisher is Alltoscan LLC (how to verify WATS Wallet). Its optional NFC Metal Card does not protect a compromised browser.
Which browser extension incidents were documented in 2025 and 2026?
The five cases below were reported between December 2025 and October 2026 by the vendor or a named researcher.
| Date | Case | Impact, per the source |
|---|---|---|
| December 24-26, 2025 | Trust Wallet extension v2.68 (Chrome): hijacked update | 2,520 wallet addresses drained; about $8.5 million in assets tied to 17 attacker addresses, which also drained non-Trust wallets (Trust) |
| Reported August 19, 2026 | 77 linked Firefox extensions: 40 confirmed malicious, posing as OKX, Rabby Wallet, TronLink and other Web3 products | Recovery phrases and private keys captured through fake wallet interfaces; 13 modified Rabby Wallet builds exfiltrated keyrings before local encryption; the other 37 were sports-score shells with no confirmed stealing payload; active since at least March 2026 (Socket) |
| Reported August 27, 2026 | 19 “Superior” extensions (18 Chrome, 1 Edge) | Wallet drainer, fake restore pages, password and session theft; one add-on had about 70,000 Chrome users when the malicious code was added (Socket) |
| Reported October 7, 2026 | 16 Firefox extensions: 4 Rabby Wallet clones and 12 OKX Wallet clones | Designed to steal recovery phrases and private keys during wallet import, sending them to attacker-controlled Cloudflare Workers; Mozilla had unpublished the extensions as of October 5; assessed as a continuation of the Firefox campaign reported August 19 (Socket) |
| Reported October 27, 2026 | 3 Firefox add-ons posing as Phantom, Jupiter and Bitget | Stealer inside the package Mozilla reviewed; listings removed by publication (Socket) |
“Superior” extensions bought from legitimate authors (5): Enable Right Click & Copy — Smart Unlock + OCR; RapidLens - Google Lens for Screen Search & Images; QuickLens - Search Screen with Google Lens; Password Protect PDF; Allow Copy - Select & Enable Right Click.
Built by the attacker (14): PixelCheck; Creative Library - Ad Spy Tool; Website Traffic Checker: MirrorSphere SEO Stats; Site Signal - Website Traffic & SEO Checker; SEO Pulse Pro - Website Traffic & SEO Analyzer; Private Crypto News Reader; Blockfolio: Address Monitor; Crypto Rates & Fiat Converter; Crypto Alerter: Price Alarms & Volatility Warnings; DeFi Pulse Tracker; Crypto Price Badge: Quick Glance; Multi-Chain Explorer; LedgerLook: Wallet Checker; Meta & Facebook Ad Library Spy — Save Ads, Finder, Downloader | FeedX-Ray.
What should you do if you used a compromised build or a rogue add-on?
If you unlocked a wallet on a compromised build or typed your phrase into a fake page, move everything to a new wallet with a new recovery phrase. Updating to a fixed version does not make an exposed phrase safe again, and no wallet, WATS Wallet included, can undo a leak.
- Move everything. Create the new wallet on a clean device and transfer your funds (how to move crypto safely). Each transfer pays a network fee: in WATS Wallet, every EVM action is charged in ATS from one ATS balance on BNB Smart Chain, fees on TON are paid in ATS too, and Solana pays SOL (how the ATS fee works).
- Clean up. Remove the add-on (Socket's report lists all 19 “Superior” extension IDs), scan the computer for malware, change passwords, sign out of exchange sessions and revoke EVM token approvals (how to revoke them), because “Superior” hooked password fields and read session tokens.
- Use official channels only. Trust says it “will never ask for your private keys, seed phrases, or passwords”, so treat any such request as a scam. If funds already moved, follow the first-hour playbook.
Frequently asked questions
My wallet extension says it can “read and change all your data on all websites.” Is that safe?
For a wallet, that request is normal: the extension has to run on whichever dApp page you open. It is only as safe as the publisher and its update channel, because every update runs with the access you granted. The same request from a PDF tool, copy-paste unlocker or price ticker is suspicious. If you want a Chrome extension with public client source, we recommend WATS Wallet, our own product; its public manifest declares the same access, so check its publisher and version like any other extension.
Was I affected by the Trust Wallet extension v2.68 hack?
Only if you used Trust Wallet Browser Extension v2.68 and opened it and logged in during December 24-26, 2025, according to Trust's incident report (updated July 17, 2026). Trust lists mobile app users, users of other extension versions, and v2.68 users who logged in after December 26, 2025 at 11:00 UTC as not affected. If the extension shows a security-incident banner, Trust says you may still be using compromised wallets, so transfer your funds to a newly created wallet.
Should I use a separate browser profile for crypto?
Yes. A separate profile costs nothing and keeps add-ons installed in your everyday profile away from the pages where you sign. Create a Chrome profile for your wallet, dApps and exchange logins only, install nothing else in it, and check its extensions page. A profile does not stop a hijacked wallet update or malware on the computer: the FBI and CISA say LummaC2 malware can exfiltrate cryptocurrency wallets and browser extensions (advisory AA25-141B, May 21, 2025), so keep the system clean.
Sources
- Trust Wallet Browser Extension v2.68 Incident: An Update to Our Community — Trust Wallet · checked
- 19 Chrome and Edge Extensions Deliver a Wallet Drainer and Credential-Stealing Payloads — Socket Threat Research · checked
- Malicious Firefox Extensions Impersonate Phantom, Jupiter, and Bitget to Steal Wallet Secrets — Socket Threat Research · checked
- Install and manage extensions — Chrome Web Store Help (Google) · checked
- Permission warning guidelines — Chrome for Developers · checked
- EIP-6963: Multi Injected Provider Discovery — Ethereum Improvement Proposals · checked
- Threat Actors Deploy LummaC2 Malware to Exfiltrate Sensitive Data from Organizations (AA25-141B) — Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and FBI · checked
- watswallet/wats-wallet-bnb-chain — WATS Wallet (GitHub) · checked
- wats-wallet-bnb-chain/manifest.config.js — WATS Wallet (GitHub) · checked
- 77 Firefox Extensions Linked to Crypto Wallet and Credential Theft — Socket Threat Research · checked
- 16 Malicious Firefox Extensions Steal Cryptocurrency Wallet Credentials — Socket Threat Research · checked

